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This essay examines normative aspects of the gainful employment
rule and how the policy frame and image miss important implications for student aid policy. Because the economic and social burdens
associated with the policy are typically borne by certain socioeconomic and ethnic groups, the policy frame and image do not
identify possible negative connotations associated with higher levels
of student loan default and debt-burden. This essay argues that little
attention has been paid to the normative associations surrounding
this policy and the ways that the framing of the issues creates a
specific image for policymakers and the tax-paying public.
Key Words: Gainful employment, student loan default

F

or-profit higher education institutions have been a part of the
American higher education landscape for at least the past century,
though their presence has only truly been felt for roughly the past
twenty years (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Breneman, Pusser, &
Turner, 2006; Kinser, 2007; Millora, 2010; Ruch, 2001; Tierney &
Hentschke, 2007). This increased presence has also resulted in increased
attention to the admissions, recruitment, and financial aid practices of such
institutions. One need only look to recent articles in The Chronicle of Higher
Education and Inside Higher Ed to understand the scrutiny these institutions
face regarding federal student loan defaults, questionable financial aid
practices, and promises of gainful employment (Blumenstyk, 2011a, b;
Fain, 2014; Field, 2010, 2011, 2014). Prior to the gainful employment rule’s
implementation, concerns were raised by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2011a, b) and its director Gregory Kutz (2011).
Similarly, multiple individuals- including, David Hawkins (2011), Director
of Public Policy and Research for the Association for College Admission
Counseling; Dr. Michale McComis (2011), Executive Director for the
Accrediting Commission for Career Schools and Colleges; Robert
Shireman (2011), Deputy Undersecretary for the U.S. Department of
Education; and Mary Mitchelson (2011), Acting Inspector General for the
U.S. Department of Education- were called before the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions to provide testimony. Based on
these hearings, the Department of Education enacted regulations under
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the heading “gainful employment” in 2011 that would define gainful
employment and effectively limit the amount of debt students enrolled in
for-profit educational institutions or vocational programs could incur
based on a set of measures established by the US Department of Education (ED) (NACUBO, 2011; ED, 2011).
Though ED implemented the rules in July 2011, challenges to the new
regulations were soon brought in federal court. In mid-2012 “gainful
employment” regulations as implemented were found to be arbitrary in
their chosen metrics. While the ruling delayed the implementation of the
policy, it also made explicit the notion that ED had authority to define and
monitor gainful employment measures and outcomes. This led the Obama
administration to announce new steps to combat concerns about student
loan debt levels and default through updated regulations decidedly focused
on the for-profit sector (ED, 2014; Fain, 2014; Field, 2014). Based on the
most recent version of the regulations, two primary debt-to-income
measures tests are to be employed and cohort rates rather than total
default rates will be used to determine eligibility for participation in federal
aid programs.
Given the great deal of attention focused on loan default rates and debt
incurred by students at for-profit institutions, it is important to understand
how the policy frame misses some rather important normative concerns.
Therefore, in this essay I examine the empirical considerations and normative aspects that the gainful employment rule engenders and how the policy
frame and image1, while useful, misses important implications for student
aid policy2. Because the economic and social burdens associated with the
policy are typically borne by certain socio-economic and ethnic groups, the
policy frame and its image do little to identify possible negative connotations of certain groups that are associated with higher levels of student
loan default and debt-burden based on the research literature. This essay
argues that little attention has been paid to the normative associations
surrounding this policy and the ways in which the framing of the issues
creates a specific image for policymakers and the tax-paying public.
In addition to the preceding, this essay will consider how empirical and
economic considerations have taken center stage in the process of defining
the policy’s image and the negative consequences associated with it. For
example, Karen Gross (2014) and Jacob Gross & Nicholas Hillman (2014)
all note that current metrics are seriously flawed and miss many important
contextual factors. This is not to suggest that analyzing student aid policy
in a quantitative manner is itself un-useful; in fact, doing so provides
fruitful results and information. The goal of this analysis is instead to draw
out the importance of the inclusion of normative implications that this
policy engenders but which up to now have been largely omitted from the
policy debate. Moreover, I am not suggesting that the normative implications considered here are specific to the gainful employment rule, but
rather that this type of policy framing may be problematic on the whole
and could extend to other areas of higher education policy. Perhaps by
understanding the normative implications of this specific policy it may
become clearer how policy formulation and implementation in higher
education can benefit from including normative concerns more directly.
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The Gainful
Employment
Rule:
Background
and Overview

In reaction to concerns from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO, 2011a), Congress, and the tax-paying public, the U.S. Department
of Education proposed a policy rule entitled “gainful employment” in July
of 2010. The policy was aimed at more clearly defining “gainful” college
education with regard to employment. It also generated debt restrictions to
stem what was considered to be excessive loan burden accumulated by
students at for-profit higher education institutions. While the policy also
applied to occupational training at more traditional public and private
institutions, the rhetoric and politics surrounding the policy issue were and
remain decidedly focused on for-profit educational institutions. Another
important consideration is that these institutions tend to enroll higher
proportions of students from socio-economically disadvantaged3 backgrounds and underrepresented groups4 (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010;
Field, 2010, 2011; GAO, 2011a,b; Kutz, 2011). The policy as initially
proposed sought to limit student loan debt by subjecting gainful employment programs to a three-measure test of program graduate data. In the
most recent iteration of the regulations these measures have changed and
are now based on two primary metrics that are to be discussed as part of
the rulemaking session to take place in 2014 (ED, 2014). To be clear, debt
measures included in the policy are aimed at programs on the whole, so as
a result individual students may have ratios that exceed the thresholds
outlined in the policy while the institution can still meet overall compliance
requirements, if aggregate ratios remain within thresholds (NACUBO,
2011; ED, 2011).
Programs must meet at least one of the measures to pass the gainful
employment rule threshold for compliance. In other words, the program
meets with compliance measures if it can show that the annual debt-todiscretionary income of a program’s typical graduate is not more than
30%, or that a program’s graduates’ debt-to-total earnings ratio is less than
12% on average. If an institution fails on both income measures twice in a
three-year period, they would not qualify to participate in federal aid
programs (Field, 2014). Therefore, although expressed as a two-measure
rule, a program must meet only one of these measures to remain in
compliance (NACBUO, 2011; ED, 2011). For those programs below the
thresholds but within a certain zone on debt-to-income measures of 812% or 20-30% for cohort default rates, new regulations would be
adopted. In this case institutions would not be allowed to remain in these
“zones” for more than four consecutive years or they would become
ineligible to participate in Title IV programs. Also, as long as the program
is within these zones it must warn students that they may not be eligible
for future aid (ED, 2014; Fain, 2014; Field, 2014).
These thresholds are intended to provide information for prospective
students and to serve as an early warning system. The goal of this warning
system is two-fold. First, it is intended to provide more information for
students in order for them to make the best choices between programs
with differing levels of risk regarding their ability to obtain federal funds.
Second, it is intended to allow students to differentiate between programs
that still have sufficient time to make required changes to meet the thresholds and those programs in imminent danger of losing federal funding
(ED, 2014). Gross (2014) states that as far as defaults are concerned,
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reported averages may not provide enough information for student
decision-making. This is a significant limitation of this early warning
system.

Literature
Review

The empirical literature regarding default rates among students from forprofit colleges indicates that for-profit school students account for a
disproportionate share of student loan defaults (Bennett, Luchesi, &
Vedder, 2010; Blumenstyk, 2011 a, b; GAO, 2011b; Hentschke, Lechuga, &
Tierney, 2010; Hentschke, 2010; Kutz, 2011; Ruch, 2001; Scanlon &
McComis, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). The same literature also
shows that these students tend to have larger debt-burdens upon departure
or graduation and that the primary populations served by for-profit
educational institutions are from underrepresented and low-income
backgrounds (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012). Furthermore, it is also clear
that students from low-income backgrounds, which tends to be correlated
with status as an underrepresented minority, are also more likely to default
on student loans in general (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Field, 2010,
2011; GAO, 2011b; Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Kinser, 2009;
Kutz, 2011; Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). The only empirical
evidence of student loan-defaults within what was then considered an
acceptable range from students that have attended for-profit institutions
was presented by Ruch (2001). However, subsequent literature, as well as
recent reports by Blumenstyk (2011a, b), show that this is simply not the
case based upon the available data. The National Student Loan Data
System (2011) provides evidence that, as compared to public institutions,
both non-profit privates and for-profit institutions have much higher
default rates in their programs, with duration of less than 2 years.
For example, using data from NSLDS, for the years 2007-2009, the
average default rates at public institution programs of less than 2 years
were 8.03%, non-profit privates 13.73%, and for-profits 12.7% (see figures
on the next page). In this instance, one might ask why the same policy
attention and the rules governing program integrity in terms of marketing,
recruitment, and admissions do not also apply to non-profit programs of
less than two years. Moving further along in the data, the average across
the same years for these institutions for programs at public institutions
with a duration of 2-3 years was 10.6%, non-profit privates 8.8%, and at
for-profits 13.3%. When one moves beyond 2-year programs the differences in defaults become more significant across institutional types with
for-profits at the top (see Figure 3). However, it is clear that in terms of
loan defaults, students at non-profit private and for-profit institutions in
programs with a duration of less than 2 years at have higher default rates.
The reason for increased attention may be due to the overall default rates
associated with proprietary institutions instead of program type. For
example, average default rates across the same three years for all programs
show that public institutions have a rate of approximately 6.4%, non-profit
privates 4.1%, and for-profits 12.5%. In other words, it may be that the
legislation, although aimed in many ways at for-profit institutions, also aims
to limit defaults in vocational programs at all types of institutions.
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Figure 1. Average Student Default Rates 2007-2009, Programs
Less than 2 Years
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Source: National Student Loan Data System (2011) from http://www2.ed.gov/offices/
OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html

Figure 2. Average Student Default Rates 2007-2009, Programs
2 - 3 Years
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Source: National Student Loan Data System (2011) from http://www2.ed.gov/offices/
OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html
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Figure 3. Average Student Default Rates 2007-2009, All Programs
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Source: National Student Loan Data System (2011) from http://www2.ed.gov/offices/
OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html

It is evident from the numerous studies cited above, and the data on
student loan defaults, that default rates are higher among students associated with specific student characteristics: attending a for-profit institution,
minority background, or low-income. It is also patently the case that forprofit institutions provide a service to students whom may find it difficult,
if not impossible, to access higher education otherwise. That is, for-profit
institutions serve an under-served demographic (Breneman, Pusser, &
Turner, 2006; Hentschke, 2010; Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012;
Hentschke, Lechuga, & Tierney, 2010). They provide access to higher
education for a population that might not otherwise obtain access, as
evidenced by for-profit institutions’ significant enrollments of
underrepresented and socio-economically disadvantaged students. The
reason that they do this could be related to at least three reasons.
First, these institutions often maintain admissions standards that fall on
the lower side of the spectrum when compared to traditional non-profit
college and universities. Second, they typically employ a cadre of specialists
that help students traverse the intricate institutional hierarchies related to
financing their education. Third, one simply needs to examine the often
significant role played by marketing in the for-profit sector. Marketing
efforts from many for-profit institutions has been shown to often target
vulnerable populations (Schade, 2014). This is why the policy image
matters so much in this case. As noted by Hossler (2004), most non-profit
institutions seek to balance revenue generation with class diversity and
prestige. Because these three goals can often work at cross-purposes,
traditional non-profit institutions are typically not equipped to help these
students navigate an often complex admissions and financial aid process.
Even community colleges have recognized the struggles associated with
providing needed support during the initial stages of the enrollment
experience (Cooper, 2010).
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Moreover, the goal of the gainful employment policy is to define gainful
employment and to limit debt burden by adopting a formula to determine
what ED considers appropriate based upon statistical analysis. However,
the final provisions adopted allow more time for institutions to comply and
lessens the number of institutions that would have initially been rendered
ineligible under the preliminary proposal. This calls into question the true
motives behind this policy action. The regulations are aimed primarily at
the for-profit sector, thus implicitly framing the policy as a problem with
student defaults from this sector. Given these intricacies, it becomes
necessary to understand the normative implications such data and empirical findings suggest.
In the case of student loans, students have come to bear a greater share
of the costs associated with obtaining a degree. This has especially been
the case as state and federal governments have become more comfortable
with cost-sharing and the economic ideals of derived private benefits
(Johnstone, 2004; Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010). In the event that a student
and his or her family is unfamiliar with the process of attending and paying
for college, the goals of program integrity and the policy rules overall
should consider both the economics of the situation as well as the framing
of the problem. In other words, socio-economically disadvantaged students, who are often from underrepresented groups, may be more vulnerable to misleading marketing or understatement of the potential benefits
of seeking a very expensive college degree, given their larger numbers at
for-profit institutions (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; GAO, 2011a). What
is more, the framing of the policy as a “consumer protection” appears
double-edged. On the one hand, it aims to protect these students from
large or unsustainable debt-burden. On the other, it explicitly ignores the
characteristics and conditions that have largely contributed to the student
loan-default problem (ED, 2011) and the social justice issues that accompany these circumstances. By ignoring characteristics correlated with higher
levels of debt-burden and debt-default, ED has chosen a policy frame that
disproportionately focuses on a specific part of the population—students
at for-profit institutions. In so doing, they have likely contributed to
implicit, but negative, connotations associated with students who attend
these institutions because of the policy’s focus on loan-default regulations
aimed primarily at this higher education sector.

Student Debt
and Default

Student loan debt can quickly become unmanageable when students,
expecting a well-paying job after graduation, utilize debt to cover both
educational costs and other household expenditures (such as housing and
food) that accrue while the student is enrolled. Therefore, a reliance on
debt can become a vicious cycle for these individuals. Unlike students who
are wealthier or have access to greater social capital and family resources,
students from low-income backgrounds (which tend to be correlated with
underrepresented status) may have no other recourse but to borrow while
in college. Subsequently, these students may be more likely to default on
their debt if its level is too high, they are under- or unemployed, or if they
are simply unaware of the numerous repayment options available to them
(K. Gross, 2014). Further, the much higher prices students face at forprofit educational institutions may exacerbate this situation, as students are
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required to obtain more debt to cover these higher costs. Hence, the
probability of default is already higher for underrepresented and lowincome students based on contextual factors omitted in the policy’s
framing (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Field, 2010, 2011; GAO,
2011b; Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Kinser, 2009; Kutz, 2011;
Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007).
A larger problem lies in the sheer level of debt incurred in the process as
well as the prospects for gainful employment, given the number of possible obstacles facing many socio-economically disadvantaged students (see
Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009, for a full discussion). For example,
Deming, Goldin, & Katz (2012) utilize regression analysis to examine
default data spanning 2004-2009 across institutions, controlling for a
number of institutional factors including demographic composition and
locality effects. Their findings show higher default rates than those calculated from NSLDS above using only three years of data. Their results
indicate that for-profit default rates are 8.7 points higher than four-year
public and private non-profit institutions and 5.7 points higher than for
non-profit public community colleges. Moreover, Deming, Golden, & Katz
(2012) indicate that these institutions serve primarily underrepresented,
non-traditional, and socioeconomically disadvantaged students. The study
also provides evidence that students who attend and graduate from
programs at for-profit institutions often have much larger debt-burdens
upon exit, have higher levels of loan-default, and after six years have higher
levels of unemployment and lower pay relative to students at non-profit
institutions. The authors go on to highlight the fact that at least as far as
retention is concerned, at the certificate and associate degree levels, forprofits do a good job of keeping students enrolled and graduating them
from these programs. However, the study underscores the sentiment many
for-profit students shared regarding the quality and price of their education. In short, they were less satisfied and often did not feel their education
was worth the cost.

The Gainful
Employment
Rule Policy
Frame

76

ED has essentially defined the gainful employment rule in terms of
financial metrics which bound methodological approaches (Dunn, 2012;
Guba, 1984) for understanding the policy’s impacts and the image it
creates. This approach and policy frame effectively limits and omits what
are considered important normative concerns regarding the populations
typically served by these types of institutions. Further, this policy frame
arguably perpetuates negative images of students (and by extension
borrowers) at these types of institutions. For example, much of the
language in the rule is aimed at defining gainful employment by
operationalizing the problem as an issue with “taxpayer burden” in terms
of defaults. The gainful employment rule aims to protect students at forprofit educational institutions from large or unsustainable debt-burden but
explicitly ignores many of the characteristics and normative conditions that
the research literature has shown to impact student loan-default and debtburden (ED, 2011). Specifically, the policy frame also does not 1) take into
account individual circumstances because of the policy’s focus on the
problem as an economic issue, 2) address what is likely stigmatization of
socio-economically disadvantaged and underrepresented students who are
Journal of Student Financial Aid
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more likely to attend for-profit institutions, because the rules effectively
limit the policy primarily to this sector, and 3) consider how emphasis at
the institutional level may create completion barriers for students whose
institution has exceeded the established debt-measure limits. By creating a
policy that is broad enough that its stated purpose is consumer protection,
but omits any language related to the consumers it argues need protection,
the policy explicitly overlooks normative considerations. In fact, the
language in the final policy stated that although ED was asked to consider
socio-economic status and demographics, policymakers agreed that this
request was unwarranted. For example, under thresholds for debt measurement ED (2011, para. 76, p. 34393) states:
The Department does not agree that the thresholds should be
adjusted to reflect the demographics or economic status of the
students enrolled in gainful employment programs. Students are
not well served by enrolling in programs that leave them with
debts they cannot afford to repay, regardless of their background.
Moreover, as illustrated in the Student Demographics section of
the RIA, there are institutions and programs achieving strong
results with students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and many
programs serving even the most disadvantaged students are
performing well under the debt measure.
On its face, the department’s assertion that students do not gain from
attending a program where they leave with unmanageable debt is true;
however, the statement does not consider the demographics or economic
status of the groups who typically attend these institutions. Thus, gainful
employment is a broad-based policy that omits two very important reasons
correlated with attendance and departure of individuals at these institutions. First, it fails to consider the fact that students attending these
institutions may inherently have more difficulty repaying loans. Second,
these students tend leave with higher levels of debt than their peers at
more traditional institutions because borrowing is often the only way they
can afford to access higher education at all. This notion is supported in a
literature review by Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman (2009) which indicates that students from underrepresented backgrounds and/or who have
less resources or familial assistance tend to default on student loan repayment at higher rates. This review highlights the findings of a host of
studies, including: Boyd (1997), Gladieux & Perna (2005), Podgursky,
Ehlert, Monroe, Watson, & Wittstruck (2002), and Harrast (2004) (all cited
in Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009), which each provide evidence
that demographic and socioeconomic factors matter in terms of student
debt.
By stating the policy’s goal primarily in terms of economic considerations and “taxpayer burden,” its normative implications are underscored.
Namely, that the role played by student characteristics and background is
ignored by this framing especially as related to the type of institutions they
generally attend and for debt levels and repayment. Additionally, recent
reports in the Washington Post (de Vise, 2011) and Inside Higher Ed (Nelson,
2011) suggest that even the provisions that have been adopted nonetheless
miss their economic protections in the short-term; under pressure and
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intense criticism from the for-profit sector, the economic and “consumer
protections” the policy sought to implement were dampened in the final
adoption, which extended grace and implementation periods, weakened
thresholds, and lessened punitive actions (ED, 2011). Therefore, even the
consumer protections included in the final policy language were watereddown to some extent.
The reaction of the Department of Education (ED) to the concerns
raised by the GAO, Congress, and the public have framed the nature of the
proposal, as well as to define it as policy in the event of its adoption. In
this case, ED defined the boundaries of the policy proposal as a strategy to
fix an economic problem. It is likely that this definition of the problem
was spurred by increasing attention from the media, scholars, and government surrounding the disproportionate student-loan defaults from students who had attended for-profit institutions. Moreover, the profit-motive
of such institutions has in recent years been questioned, especially when
significant attention to student loan-default rates increased (Bennett,
Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Blumenstyk, 2011 a,b; GAO, 2011a; Hentschke,
Lechuga, & Tierney, 2010; Hentschke, 2010; Kutz, 2011; Ruch, 2001;
Scanlon & McComis, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). Many policymakers feel that “profit” and “education” should not be included in the
same sentence, while others disagree, which likely played a role in the
framing of the gainful employment policy. This perception of the problem
has served to define the policy image and frame in a very specific way. In
other words, ideology probably played a more important role in framing
this policy in terms of consumer protections given the emphasis on
taxpayer burden.
Baumgartner & Jones (1991, 1993) show that a policy’s image or frame
matters not only for whether or not it is adopted but where and how, as
well as the amount of attention and possible revisions it may face. Additionally, Rosen (2009) restates the importance of policy as both a rhetorical
and symbolic tool. Therefore, it could be argued that ED, by responding in
such a manner, has reacted to the problematic image that resulted from
increased concern with student-loan default rates by students both departing and graduating from for-profit institutions. It may also be the case that
the policy question and proposal were meant as a symbol to be taken as
evidence that the Department of Education is addressing the issue.
However, in this same process little if any attention was paid to the
normative implications surrounding this policy, its framing, and its image namely the fact that the economic concerns and social burden are decidedly borne by certain social and racial groups. While it is true that the
policy aims to “protect” these consumers, framing the policy in such a way
reifies what could be argued to be a tainted image that accompanies loan
defaults given the propensity of underrepresented and socio-economically
disadvantaged students, statuses which are highly correlated with one
another, to attend such institutions.
While the policy addresses the problem of deceptive marketing, recruitment, and admissions practices that some for-profit higher education
institutions undertake to attract students, who subsequently borrow in
order to cover educational expenses, with the promise of “gainful employ78
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ment” after graduation, it does so in a separate set of program integrity
regulations (ED, 2011). However, this action limits the requirements to the
for-profit sector, whose students are primarily those who have not historically been represented in higher education.

Discussion

Before analyzing the normative aspects of the policy under consideration,
it is important to highlight a larger issue concerning normative analysis:
specifically, the frequent omission of normative features embedded in
student aid policy analysis. This is in addition to the embedded nature of
these features in the formulation of policy proposals in this domain. For
example, Birkland (2005) and Dunn (2012) highlight the necessary interplay between empirical evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, and
common societal values and interests. Birkland goes on to say that in many
instances, at least in American history, emotion and ideology have overridden empirical evidence at different stages in the policy process. For example, during the “food stamp debates” of the 1980s and 1990s,
significant anecdotal evidence, which might have been more closely related
to ideological evangelism, was offered in defense of “individual initiative
and limited government” (p. 9) in order to illustrate the policy’s shortcomings. This example shows how important normative considerations are
when framing a debate. In the food stamp case, those who participated in
the program were inherently lacking in individual initiative based on the
policy’s framing and image. In the current political environment, where
much of the same rhetoric and virtues are being extolled, this seems to be
the case as well. The normative implications of the gainful employment
rule as currently framed suggest that default rates and debt levels are a
problem at for-profit institutions. The policy fails to recognize why
students from certain backgrounds might attend these institutions, why
they might be at higher risk for default, and how the non-profit sector
might better serve these individuals.
Turning to financial aid, student loan policy debates tend to be guided by
a rational and scientific approach of analysis and evaluation.5 Financial aid
policy surrounding student loans and related defaults are no exception to
this trend. Policy questions are often framed in such a way that leads to
primary emphasis on quantitative data and methods, thus omitting what
could be critical qualitative data and/or normative considerations, as seems
to be the case in the current context. The concern is that studies of
student aid and student aid policies that fail to incorporate important
normative aspects in the formulation and implementation process, by
basing decisions mainly on quantitative analysis and financial metrics, may
omit important facets that affect public policy and conceptions of social
justice. In other words, omission of normative concerns affects the way in
which the policy is understood and, subsequently, how the public, government, and students and families interpret the policy and its goals.
In the case of the “gainful employment” rule, the policy has been framed
as an economic policy issue, at least on its face. The normative implications
of the policy proposal, namely the stigma attached with debt-default and
the characteristics associated with higher levels of debt and default,
received little if any attention. The policy solution, adoption, and initial
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proposal were framed as a response to employment and wages, larger debtburden, and high default rates of students who attend for-profit institutions. Of second-order was that a vulnerable cross-section of the
population was likely being exploited and that a certain stigma was possibly
being attributed to students who attended these institutions. As illustrated
in the Literature Review, the large amount of research on the topic is not
ambiguous regarding who attends these institutions, who is most likely to
default, and who accrues the most debt (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010;
Field, 2010, 2011; Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; GAO, 2011a,b; Gross,
Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Hinze-Pifer & Fry, 2010; Kinser, 2009;
Kutz, 2011; Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007).
Nevertheless, the policy is defined in terms of financial metrics associated with a social problem. For example, J. Gross and Hillman (2014)
indicate that public perception of student loan debt and default can drive
how the policy is understood. Negative connotations and policy framing
surrounding student defaults and higher debt-burdens are associated with
for-profit institutions and the students they serve. This is done while
omitting the introduction of some of the important characteristics associated with default and debt burden into the policy itself. Even when such
topics enter the debate, they are often couched in terms of “taxpayer
burden” and the costs incurred by the federal government under the
generic title of “consumer protections.” Moreover, although, the possible
lack of clarity and information about debt-accrual is mentioned explicitly
(GAO, 2011a; Kutz, 2011), little concern is given to the possible stigmatizing effect framing the policy in such a way may have, especially given its
nearly myopic focus on the for-profit sector.
In a related vein, economic theory has also been used to justify the
increased presence of for-profit higher education intuitions. Market ideals,
typically based on economic theory primarily applicable to the private
sector, are used implicitly to blame individuals for their own financial plight
and serve as the basis for a policy frame of this type. In a comprehensive
analysis of for-profit higher education, Bennett et al., (2010, pp. 53-54)
state:
The concept of consumer sovereignty asserts that the consumer
ultimately determines how a society’s resources will be allocated
based on their decisions of what to buy and what not to buy.
Profits will only be generated in markets in which the product is in
high demand. Profit creates the incentive for firms to provide more
of the product, thus automatically drawing resources into productive activities that satisfy consumers’ wants and needs.
The authors’ statement is correct if, and only if, they assume that price
reflects the marginal benefit of the service6 to the consumer. They are also
correct if they assume that the price is market clearing and that no information asymmetries exist. However, given the economic structure of the
higher education sector this is not the case because institutions have much
more information than students and families in the admissions process. In
the context of underrepresented and socio-economically disadvantaged
students, this is likely a false assumption. The very basis for subsidizing
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higher education is to lower the effective price the student/consumer faces
so as to encourage enrollment (GAO, 2011; Kutz, 2011; Neill, 2009). Thus,
the analysis leaves out what are arguably important characteristics specific
to higher education and in particular to for-profit higher education.
Specifically, that the consumer does not confront the true costs for an
education measured by price in a private market, and as evidenced in the
empirical literature significant information asymmetries exist. In other
words, for-profits can extract higher levels of tuition and fees because the
student does not fully understand the costs and benefits associated with a
degree from a program. Additionally, this could also be the reason that
students at these institutions employ large amounts of debt to finance their
degrees. That is, the profit motive of these institutions can create an
incentive to help students find ways to pay for their education.
Finally, the policy proposal also does not address how it might create
barriers to completion. Students in the middle of a college career at a forprofit institution may be forced to withdraw due to what some consider are
arbitrary limits on their ability to obtain debt financing for their college
education (Field, 2010, 2011). In the final rules, the policy is decidedly at
the program level, and as a result student experience and background is all
but left out of the equation. Therefore, students may be forced to exit a
program without a degree, yet with a large debt burden and fewer prospects for employment, thus effectively limiting future choices.
Overall, the policy frame leaves many normative implications unaddressed. While it is unclear whether the policy will have the intended
impact on decreasing student loan defaults, its normative impacts and
implications seem rather clear. First, students from socio-economically
disadvantaged or underrepresented backgrounds who are unfamiliar with
the student aid and college-going process may be vulnerable to marketing
and recruitment practices that promise gainful employment. This promise
however comes at what is clearly a steep cost even with the new rules in
place. A second concern is that by framing the policy as a solely quantitative economic issue, important social justice issues remain largely ignored.
Even with more information, for-profit students may not complete their
degree because of misunderstandings regarding debt ratios impacting the
institution and its eligibility for federal grants and loans. It is unlikely that
students in this predicament would find relief in the current policy given
the rhetoric surrounding it, which implicitly places blame for out-ofcontrol debt and loan defaults on students’ misuse of debt. It also does so
while simultaneously focusing on a specific higher education sector. In the
same way, ED’s decision to ignore what the research literature has shown
to be important indicators of possible loan-defaults, higher debt-burden
and more unemployment, underscores the policy’s rather narrow focus.
This, therefore, is an important aspect that should be included in the
student aid policy debate and the framing of social problems and potential
solutions.

Limitations
of the Essay

While this essay has aimed to analyze a specific policy proposal and its
implementation, it became clear that the “gainful employment rule”
intersects many other student aid policy domains and normative issues.
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Therefore, some limitations remain. First, questions of education quality
have largely been left out of this analysis in order to focus on the specific
policy. Second, the role of faculty in curricular affairs and governance in
for-profit educational institutions has also been omitted. Third and finally,
the analysis of distinct markets and competition pressures that exist
between for-profit colleges and universities and non-profit public and
private colleges and universities were also not the focus of the analysis. It
is important to note that these topics are all related to the current analysis;
however, they must be left to future studies.

Conclusions

The “gainful employment” rule firmly falls within the bounds of the
current debate on student aid policy as well as social equity. ED has
defined the “gainful employment” rule as a societal problem that was
subsequently framed as an economic issue. In so doing, this essay argues
that the policy has omitted important normative implications that accompany student aid policy and questions of equity, especially given the rather
robust research literature on the topic. As noted recently in Inside Higher Ed
(K. Gross, 2014; J. Gross & Hillman, 2014), many concerns around student
debt and default remain regarding appropriate metrics, philosophical
positions, public perception, and information asymmetries. These concerns
are not limited to for-profit institutions but somehow, under the gainful
employment rule, have risen to prominence in debates on federal aid
policy.
ED has enacted the policy to ensure that students attending programs in
recognized occupations were in fact being prepared for gainful employment by primarily for-profit institutions. It did so by establishing a definition of gainful employment that essentially, through rules aimed at
diminishing the debt-burden and defaults of students who attend proprietary institutions, has specified conditions that would allow an institution
which exceeds certain ratios to be ineligible for federal Title IV funds.
However, ED has also left out an important normative aspect of the
policy: that students from under-privileged and under-represented backgrounds tend to disproportionately bear the burden of student loan
defaults in the for-profit sector. The policy neglects at least three related
normative concerns. First, in its focus on the policy issue as an economic
one it does not take into account the nature of individual circumstances.
Second, it fails to address concerns with the possible stigmatization of
disadvantaged students attending for-profit institutions by employing such
a frame and limiting the rules primarily to this sector. Finally, it does not
consider how, due to emphasis at the institutional level, it may create
completion barriers for students at institutions that reach the debt-limit
imposed by the “gainful-employment” rule.
Finally, while the spirit of the policy appears to be defining what gainful
employment should entail after graduation, its economic definition and
emphasis on consumer protections framed as taxpayer burden remove
what are essentially normative concerns of equity, access, and social justice.
This is not to suggest that economic evaluation and quantitative measures
are not useful, but rather that normative implications should also be
considered. This is especially the case with a policy that is clearly aimed at a
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specific sector, and arguably at students within that sector. With the
omission of normative implications reemerges the concern that rational
and scientific approaches that remove or bracket important normative
aspects of the policy process and analysis may omit important social
aspects that affect and inform the way in which policy is formulated,
implemented, and subsequently understood and perceived.

Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice


For-profit institutions provide a service to students who may
find it difficult, if not impossible, to access higher education
otherwise. However, little attention was paid to the normative
implications surrounding gainful employment, its framing, and
its image for students attending for-profit institutions. Practitioners should be mindful of how policies frame particular sectors
of higher education and the potential effects of such framing on
student perceptions.



The normative implications considered here are not specific to
the gainful employment rule. Practitioners should be mindful of
the underlying beliefs and assumptions embedded in policies.



Because the policy does not take into account the nature of
individual circumstances it does not consider how, due to
emphasis at the institutional level, it may create completion
barriers for students at institutions that reach the debt-limit
imposed by the “gainful-employment” rule. Practitioners at
institutions will likely be challenged to find innovative ways to
help individual students achieve successful outcomes if debtlimits are reached.
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Endnotes
As noted by Rein and Schoen “framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing,
analyzing, persuading and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on”
(1993, p. 146). This is closely related to Baumgartner & Jones definition of image:
“This process is the interaction of beliefs and values concerning a particular
policy… with the existing set of political institutions-the venues of policy action”
(1991, p. 1045) which in turn can be positive or negative.
1

Given the controversial nature of the policy highlighted in this article, it is
important to state that the author has no affiliation or bias with or toward the forprofit industry financially or otherwise. The author’s only affiliation in any higher
education sector is to a public university as an assistant professor and research
institute affiliate.
2

Socio-economically disadvantaged means those students who are from families
with below-average incomes.
3

Underrepresented in this case encompasses a wide range of minority students
including those from African-American, Hispanic/Latino, Native American
backgrounds, and women and non-traditional students.
4

For example, although Dunn and Birkland both speak to the normative aspects
of the policy process and analysis, the methods they cover and offer as “off-theshelf ” are certainly geared more toward quantitative methods and data elements
related to positive analysis.
5

The use of “service” here is obviously an assumption that higher education and
its outputs (degrees) have become commoditized.
6

84

Journal of Student Financial Aid

Volume 44 • Number 1 • 2014

References
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B. (1991). Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems. The Journal of Politics, 53(4), 1044-1074.
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bennett, D., Luchesi, A., & Vedder, R. (2010). For-Profit Higher Education:
Growth, Innovation Regulation. Washington, D.C. : Center for College
Affordability.
Birkland, T. (2005). An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and
Models of Public Policy Making (2 ed.). Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
Blumenstyk, G. (2011a, February 4). Loan-Default Rate at For-Profit Colleges
Would Double Under New Formula. Retrieved June 4, 2011, from The
Chronicle of Higher Education: http://chronicle.com/article/LoanDefault-Rate-at/126250/
Blumenstyk, G. (2011b, May 20). Default Rate on Federal Student Loans Jumps
to 8.9%, a Nearly 2-Point Rise. Retrieved June 4, 2011, from The Chronicle
of Higher Education: http://chronicle.com/article/Default-Rate-onFederal/127602/
Breneman, D., Pusser, B., & Turner, S. (2006). The Contemporary Provision of For-Profit Higher Education: Mapping the Competitive Market. In
Earnings from Learning: The Rise of For-Profit Universities. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
Cooper, M. (2010, October). Student Support Services at Community Colleges: A
Strategy for Increasing Student Persistence and Attainment. Retrieved March 22,
2014, from United States Department of Education: College Completion:
http://www2.ed.gov/PDFDocs/college-completion/04-student-supportservices-at-community-colleges.pdf
de Vise, D. (2011, June 2). Washington Post. Retrieved October 6, 2011, from
Federal ‘gainful employment’ Rule Tightens Oversight of For-profit
Colleges: http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/federalgainful-employment-rule-tightens-oversight-of-for-profit-colleges/2011/
06/01/AGSiAqGH_story.html
Deming, D., Golding, C., & Katz, L. (2012). The For-Profit Postsecondary
School Sector: Nimble Critters or Agile Predators? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 26(1), 139-164.
Dunn, W. N. (2012). Public Policy Analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River,
New Jersey: Pearson, Prentice Hall.
Fain, P. (2014, March 14). Gainful Employment’s Partial Unveiling. Retrieved
March 22, 2014, from InsideHigherEd: http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2014/03/14/details-gainful-employment-proposal-expected-friday
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators

85

Field, K. (2010, July 23). Education Department Takes Aim at For-Profits With
Student-Debt Rule. Retrieved March 30, 2011, from The Chronicle of Higher
Education: http://chronicle.com/article/Education-Department-TakesAim/123655/
Field, K. (2011, June 2). For-Profit Colleges Win Major Concessions in Final
‘Gainful Employment’ Rule. Retrieved June 4, 2011, from The Chronicle of
Higher Education: http://chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges-WinMajor/127744/
Field, K. (2014, March 14). Revised ‘Gainful Employment’ Rule Breaks Little
New Ground. Retrieved March 22, 2014, from The Chronicle of Higher
Education: http://chronicle.com/article/Revised-Gainful/145329/
Government Accountability Office. (2011a). Proprietary Schools: Stronger
Department of Education Oversight Needed to Help Ensure only Eligible
Students Receive Federal Student Aid. In M. Tamblyn (Ed.), Higher Education Recruitment and Finance. New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.
Government Accountability Office. (2011b). Higher Education: Factors
Lenders Consider in Making Lending Decisions for Private Education
Loans. In M. Tamblyn, Higher Education Recruitment and Finance (pp. 133138). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.
Gross, J., Cekic, O., Hossler, D., & Hillman, N. (2009). What Matters in
Student Loan Default. The Journal of Student Financial Aid, 39(1), 19-29.
Gross, J., & Hillman, N. (2014, March 21). Student Loans II: How Much
Default? Retrieved from InsideHigherEd: http://www.insidehighered.com/
views/2014/03/21/how-much-student-loan-debt-and-default-appropriateessay
Gross, K. (2014, March 21). Student Loans I: Yes, Something Is Wrong. Retrieved from InsideHigherEd: http://www.insidehighered.com/views/
2014/03/21/we-need-right-solutions-student-debt-problem-essay
Guba, E. G. (1984). The Effect of Definitions of Policy on the Nature and
Outcomes of Policy Analysis. Educational Leadership, 42(2), 63-70.
Hentschke, G. (2010). Evolving Markets of For-Profit Higher Education.
In G. Hentschke, V. Lechuga, & W. Tierney (Eds.), For-Profit Colleges and
Universities: Their Markets, Regulation, Performance, and Place in Higher Education.
Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, LLC.
Hinze-Pifer, R., & Fry, R. (2010). The Rise of College Student Borrowing: A
Social & Demographic Trends Report. Washington, D.C: Pew Research Center.
Hossler, D. (2004). Refinancing Public Universities: Student Enrollments,
Incentive-Based Budgeting, and Incremental Revenue. In E. St. John, & M.
Parsons (Eds.), Public Funding of Higher Education: Changing Contexts and New
Rationales. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

86

Journal of Student Financial Aid

Volume 44 • Number 1 • 2014

Johnstone, D. B. (2004). The Economics and Politics of Cost Sharing in
Higher Education: Comparative Perspectives. Economics of Education Review,
23, 403-410.
Johnstone, D., & Marcucci, P. (2010). Financing Higher Education Worldwide:
Who Pays? Who Should Pay? Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Kinser, K. (2007). Dimensions of Corporate Ownership in For-Profit
Higher Education. The Review of Higher Education, 30(3), 217-245.
Kinser, K. (2009). Access in US Higher Education: What Does the For-Profit
Sector Contribute? Albany, NY: PROPHE Working Paper Series No. 14;
Program for Research on Private Higher Education.
Kutz, G. (2011). For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges
Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable Marketing
Practices. In M. Tamblyn (Ed.), Higher Education Recruitment and Finance:
Education in a Competitive and Globalizing World. New York: Nova Science
Publishers Inc.
McComis, M. (2011). Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Hearing on “For-Profit Schools: The
Student Recruitment Experience”. In M. Tamblyn, Higher Education Recruitment and Finance (pp. 51-66). New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Millora, M. (2010). Market Values in Higher Education: A Review of the
For-Profit Sector. InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information
Studies, 6(2), 1-20.
Mitchelson, M. (2011). Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Hearing on “Ensuring Student Eligibility
Requirements for Federal Aid”. In M. Tamblyn, Higher Education Recruitment
and Finance (pp. 115-122). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.
National Association of College and University Business Officers. (2011,
June 13). Controversial Gainful Employment Regulations Finalized.
Washington, D.C.
National Student Loan Data System. (2011, September). Direct Loan and
Federal Family Education Loan Programs. Retrieved March 2012, from Institutional Default Rate Comparison of FY 2007, 2008, and 2009 Cohort
Default Rates: http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/
instrates.html
Neill, C. (2009). Tuition Fees and the Demand for University Places.
Economics of Education Review, 28, 561-570.
Nelson, L. (2011, June 3). InsideHigherEd. Retrieved October 6, 2011, from
Your Guide to ‘Gainful Employment’ : http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2011/06/03/list_looking_at_gainful_employment_changes

National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators

87

Rein, M., & Schoen, D. (1993). Reframing Policy Discource. In F. Fisher, &
J. Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning (pp. 145166). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Rosen, L. (2009). Rhetoric and Symbolic Action in the Policy Process. In
G. Skyes, B. Schneider, & D. Plank, The AERA Handbook of Education Policy
Research. New York, NY, IL: American Educational Research Association.
Ruch, R. (2001). Higher Ed. Inc.: The Rise of the For-Profit University. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Scanlon, E., & McComis, M. (2010). Accreditation and Accountability. In
G. Hentschke, V. Lechuga, & W. Tierney (Eds.), For-Profit Colleges and
Universities: Their Markets, Regulation, Performance, and Place in Higher Education.
Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, LLC.
Schade, S. (2014). Reining in the predatory nature of for-profit colleges.
Arizona Law Review, 56(317), 314-340.
Sireman, R. (2011). Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Hearing on “Ensuring Student Eligibility
Requirements for Federal Aid”. In M. Tamblyn, Higher Education Recruitment
and Finance (pp. 107-133). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.
Tierney, W., & Hentschke, G. (2007). New Players, Different Game: Understanding the Rise of For-Profit Colleges and Universities. Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
U.S. Department of Education. (2011, June 13). Program Integrity: Gainful
Employment Debt-Measures. The Federal Register, 2011-13905, 34386-34539.
U.S. Department of Education. (2014, March 14). Obama Administration
Takes Action to Protect Americans from Predatory, Poor-Performing Career Colleges.
Retrieved March 22, 2014, from Press Release: http://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/obama-administration-takes-action-protect-americanspredatory-poor-performing-ca

88

Journal of Student Financial Aid

Volume 44 • Number 1 • 2014

